

A Cherry Tree Doesn't Resemble a Cherry Stone: Can Gábor Vona Remodel Hungary's Jobbik?

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*We will roar like the ocean's tide
We will fight unto the last drop of blood, and Hungary's border
Will be undivided, like it was not long ago
And once again our star will shine in the sky.[1]*
— József Attila (1922) *Nem, nem, soha!*



Source: Marsz Niepodleglosci

The Hungarian political party commonly known as Jobbik^[2]—its full name is *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*, or “Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary”—certainly looks to amplify its particular star in the Hungarian political constellation. And the country's ruling Fidesz party under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is just as determined to dim or extinguish it.

Readying his party in advance of 2018 parliamentary elections,^[3] Jobbik chairman Gábor Vona recently purged several members from its central leadership, deeming them too radical for the centrist voters Jobbik must attract if it is to unseat Fidesz. He replaced them with a group of Jobbik mayors with governing experience, none of whom are likely to veer from well-established Jobbik positions on immigration or other hot button issues.

Quickly on the heels of being reelected to his party post in late May, Mr. Vona declared in early June that Jobbik was now a *Nemzeti Néppárt* or “National People's Party.”^[4] Asserting he “is in a fighting mood,”^[5] Mr. Vona continued: “Not only are

we ready to win, we are ready to govern.”[6] Calling Jobbik “a stable political force,”[7] he said, “like a church, it needs faith; like an army, it needs discipline; and like a multinational company, it needs a professional attitude.”[8] The party, he inveighed, “is not a leisure retreat, not a wellness resort where one goes to escape the problems of the world.”[9]

Though Mr. Vona frequently refers to himself as a *hídépítő* or “bridge builder,” it is by no means certain whether this extends to potential coalition partners on the political left. The ruling Fidesz party seems worried it may, though Mr. Orbán and other party leaders (and pro-Fidesz media outlets) often mask this concern with false bravado. They often seek to diminish Jobbik by belittling its leaders and political prospects. For example, the pro-Fidesz newspaper *Magyar Idők* argued that while Jobbik may be the single strongest opposition party, far more people collectively support leftist opposition bloc parties.[10] If Fidesz leaders privately fear being flanked by a political entente between opposition parties to their right and left, in public, their scorn for any such suggestion is steadfast. The attitude is exemplified by an acerbic commentary by Péter Szikszai:

“Maybe Jobbik contemplates having the Hungarian Guard defend the next Pride Day to be held on the anniversary of Trianon, or allowing migrants to settle at Röszke, or abandoning its theory of a Hungarian-Sumerian relationship? Will they demolish Horthy’s statue? Will Vona attend services with the Assembly of God?”[11]

Rumors that Jobbik is looking leftward for coalition partners have the distinct odor of a Fidesz straw man. The newly elected head of Hungary’s leftist *Magyar Szocialista Párt* (MSZP),[12] Gyula Molnár, said that while he “understood the logic,” he “cannot imagine such a thing” as a coalition with Jobbik. The substantive gap between the two parties is yawning. The MSZP opposes the Orbán government’s plebiscite schedule for 2 October on whether to accept any future “forced” refugee resettlement by European Union. Jobbik, by contrast, supports it. The MSZP now urges members to boycott so as to deny the referendum the required minimum 50 percent turnout.[13] The party admittedly was a latecomer to the boycott effort. Elected in late June to replace József Tóbiás as party leader, Mr. Molnár, immediately aligned with other opposition parties to support the boycott, campaigning under the banner *Maradj otthon, maradj Európában!* (Stay home, stay in Europe!). Mr. Molnár has said he would go so far as to take down Hungary’s controversial border fence, something anathema to Jobbik.[14]

Mr. Vona forcefully eschews any possibility of a coalition with other opposition parties “Jobbik does not want an alliance in any form,” he asserts, calling the suggestion “the twisted brainchild of a fantasy.”[15] The pro-Fidesz *Magyar Idők* quotes approvingly the assessment of Dániel Nagy of the Nézőpont Intézet (“Viewpoint Institute,” a Hungarian think tank) that “Jobbik’s recent effort to shed its ‘radicalism’ was likely to alienate supporters.” Mr. Vona, he wrote, “May have forgotten Jobbik is a ‘protest party’ whose strength lies in its appeal to alienated voters.”[16]

Opting to go on offense, Fidesz leaders continually feed a narrative that Jobbik is unfit to govern. Many observers see the Orbán government behind recent allegations of financial and personal misconduct by Jobbik leaders, who press their party’s campaign for government “transparency” (*átláthatósággal*). There were numerous reports in recent weeks of Jobbik connections to persons such as “Jobbik billionaire”[17] Richárd Forrai, who runs Iránytű Intézet, a consulting and polling firm favored by Jobbik. Other reports allege a Jobbik connection to a company called Global Homes Group kft,[18] a Budapest real estate development company allegedly controlled by two Israeli citizens (this fact is relevant, the reports insinuates, given Jobbik’s often distinctly anti-Semitic tone). “Most of the company’s real estate projects in Budapest,” the reports allege “are in liquidation or have been forced to close.”[19] Other allegations include Jobbik leaders’ involvement in a tax-avoidance scheme to register automobiles in Slovakia (avoiding Hungary’s registration fee and higher VAT).[20]

In May, an article published in the Hungarian online tabloid *Ripost* claimed that Mr. Vona is among several Jobbik figures involved in a tax avoidance scheme through a Dominican company identified as “Panda Investments Ltd.”[21] The report identifies Panda as one of several owners of the aforementioned Global Homes Group. Panda is also the agent for D-D Consulting kft. That company is connected to the aforementioned Mr. Forrai and a second person, Zoltán Debreczeni, who is identified in public records as Global Homes Group’s managing director.[22] Other reports details how companies with close Jobbik connections have reaped large gains from party consulting contracts, including FNDDT Magyarország Kft, M-Akta, and White Heaven Kft.[23]

Other allegations of a more salacious nature have been leveled at Jobbik leaders. In June, *Ripost* accused the party’s deputy leader János Volner of infidelity and sexual misconduct.[24] The tabloid gleefully reported several days hence that Mr. Volner’s wife, Beatrix, had since instituted divorce proceedings.[25] Earlier reports identified her as the founder of a company called Diamond Business Consulting, whose sole source of revenue income was Jobbik party consulting contracts.[26]

Jobbik struck back in early July. One of its parliamentary leaders, Márton Gyöngyösi, alleged serious irregularities at the

Magyar Nemzeti Kereskedőház (“Hungarian National Trading House”). Known as the MNKH, it was established in 2013 by the Hungarian government and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce to promote exports by small and medium-sized businesses.

Other allegations are directed at persons close to Mr. Orbán, including his son-in-law, István Tiborcz. Published reports allege that companies owned or controlled by Mr. Tiborcz (which he used to make controversial Budapest real estate transactions) are connected to an Amsterdam-registered company that is controlled by a Turkish businessman named Adnan Polat.[27] Mr. Polat is said to have close ties to the Orbán government and the MNKH.[28] Mr. Tiborcz also is tied in published reports to real estate transactions involving Ammar M. A. Abu Namous. Mr. Namous is a Budapest attorney who is said to represent a Saudi financier named Ghaith Pharaon.[29] Mr. Pharaon has been on the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “ten most wanted” list continuously since 1991 for his role in the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. Mr. Pharaon’s name was raised in early June during a parliamentary hearing of the National Security Committee. That committee’s vice chair, Fidesz’s Szilárd Németh, claimed a case of mistaken identity. Mr. Németh’s halting explanation—“that Pharaon is not *this* Pharaon”[30]—was loudly denounced by Jobbik’s Mr. Gyöngyösi and by parliamentary figures across the political spectrum.

Some efforts to connect political opponents with scandal have backfired. In early June, Jobbik vice president Dávid Janiczak was convicted of libeling István Vitális, a Fidesz municipal official in Ózd, a northern Hungarian city located 150 kilometers north of Budapest where Mr. Janiczak was elected mayor in November 2014.[31] Mr. Janiczak had posted statements on his Facebook page accusing Mr. Vitális of misfeasance.[32] He was one of three mayors elected to serve as Jobbik party vice presidents at a late May party congress and has promised to appeal the district court’s decision, which could carry a penalty of up to one year’s imprisonment.[33]

It remains to be seen how all of this will affect Mr. Vona’s effort to consolidate his control over party affairs. While he ran unopposed for reelection as party chairman in May, Mr. Vona received only 79 percent of votes cast, down from 95 percent at the last party congress. He remains resolute, he says, in his intent to broaden Jobbik’s base of support—“New supporters are needed”—while he reshapes the party, much as his rival Mr. Orbán reshaped Fidesz a decade ago. To Jobbik members who discern the party’s leadership straying from its (often controversial) principles, Mr. Vona’s response is that today’s Jobbik is unlike the party that existed at its founding in 2003. “A cherry tree doesn’t resemble a cherry stone,” he declared.[34]

Any actual redirection is more likely practical than principled, reflecting as it does Jobbik’s continual *pas de deux* with rival Fidesz. As the political scientist Myra Waterbury wrote in 2010, Jobbik all along has deliberately “defined itself in opposition to Fidesz” and as “a true defense [sic] of Hungarian values and interests.”[35] And anti-western rhetoric only goes so far with Jobbik rank and file: a recent opinion poll conducted by the Polish newspaper *Parkiet* found fewer than one in four (39%) Jobbik members thought Hungary should follow United Kingdom out of the European Union.[36]

In the meantime, Jobbik is trying to gain the support of Lajos Simicska, an influential Hungarian businessman. He is a former Fidesz treasurer, and a longtime friend and confidant of Mr. Orbán, with whom he had a falling out. Mr. Simicska is the majority owner of Közgép Zrt., a company once described as having a “symbiotic relationship” with the Orbán government:

“By now it is an open secret that the country is governed not only by Viktor Orbán but also by Lajos Simicska. Or at least this is what a lot of people claim.”[37]

According to a recent report, “the Orbán government quarreled with the powerful industrialist, who now is looking for a political counterweight to Fidesz, a role which Jobbik earnestly hopes to fill.”[38] Hungary’s leading leftist newspaper, *Népszabadság*, reports that Mr. Simicska will support Jobbik in the 2018 parliamentary elections, having concluded earlier that the socialist MSZP has no chance to defeat Fidesz. Gábor Horváth expresses skepticism in a *Népszabadság* commentary as to whether voters will see Jobbik as a credible alternative to Fidesz, Mr. Simicska’s support notwithstanding. “No political vacuum remains empty,” he observes, and predicts (or more likely, hopes) that a grassroots movement to the Fidesz’s political left will emerge as an alternative.[39]

“New supporters are needed.” So instructed Mr. Vona at the recent party conference. So perhaps the most pressing of many concerns competing for Mr. Vona’s attention is (or should be) his party’s deteriorating performance among likely voters. Jobbik, one mid July commentary observed, “has been unable to increase its number of supporters due to a civil war.”[40] Jobbik was one of two so-called “movement parties”[41] that entered Hungary’s *Országgyűlés* or national parliament in 2010 (the other being the liberal-green *Lehet Más a Politika* or “Politics Can Be Different” party). It is a matter of debate whether the Jobbik (metaphoric) cherry tree—and by extension, Mr. Vona—can survive a movement to the

political center.

The translation of all source material is by the author unless otherwise noted. The title is adapted from a metaphor used by Jobbik leader Gabor Vona, which reads in the original Hungarian “egy cseresznyemag és egy cseresznyefa se hasonlít egymásra.” See: “Vona Gábor merészet lépett: lemondott a frakció vezetéséről.” *Index* [published online in Hungarian 29 May 2016]. http://index.hu/belfold/2016/05/29/vona_gabor_mereszet_lepett_lemondott_a_frakcio_vezeteserol/. Last accessed 11 July 2016.

[1] From József Attila’s 1922 poem *Nem, nem, soha!* (“No, no, never!”), the title of which refers to the popular attitude of the time toward the Trianon Treaty. The lines translated above read as follows in the original Hungarian:

Bömbölve rohanunk majd, mint a tengerár,
Egy csepp vérig küzdünk s áll a magyar határ
Teljes egészében, mint nem is oly régen
És csillagunk ismét tündöklök az égen.

[2] *Jobbik* is a portmanteau word formed from *Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség* (“Youth Association of the Right,” where *Right* connotes the group’s political orientation), a political association founded by a group of university students in 1999. *Jobbik* reorganized as a political party in 2003 and first entered Hungary’s parliament, the *Országgyűlés*, in 2010.

[3] A recent opinion poll conducted by Századvég found support for Fidesz and its coalition partner, the Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (“Christian Democrat People’s Party *aka* the KDNP) was 29 percent; for *Jobbik*, 13 percent; for the socialist Magyar Szocialista Párt (“MSZP”), 9 percent; and for the Demokrata Koalíció (“Democratic Coalition” *aka* “DK”) 5 percent. Two other parties fell below the parliamentary threshold of 5 percent: the green Lehet Más a Politika (“Politics Can Be Different” *aka* “LMP”) at 3 percent; and Együtt – A Korszakváltók Pártja (“Together- Party for a New Era” *aka* Együtt) at 1 percent. Among decided voters Fidesz-KDNP stood at 44 percent, *Jobbik* 24 percent, MSZP 16 percent, DK 8 percent, LMP 4 percent and Együtt 1 percent. See: http://www.napi.hu/magyar_gazdasag/a_szazadveg_is_az_unios_forrasoktol_varja_a_gazdasag_felporgeteset.616470.html. Last accessed 12 July 2016.

[4] “Nemzeti néppárt.” *Jobbik.hu* [published online in Hungarian 1 June 2016]. <https://jobbik.hu/hireink/nemzeti-neppart>. Last accessed 9 July 2016. Republished on [kuruc.info](https://kuruc.info/r/50/159557/) [1 June 2016]. <https://kuruc.info/r/50/159557/>. Last accessed 9 July 2016.

[5] “Továbbra is Vona Gábor a *Jobbik* elnöke.” *Nemzeti.net* [published online in Hungarian 29 May 2016]. <http://nemzeti.net/tovabbra-is-vona-gabor-a-jobbik-elnoke-4938516.html>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[6] “Vona Gábor: nemzeti néppárt vált a *Jobbik*ból.” *KárpátHír* [published online in Hungarian 31 May 2016]. <http://karpathir.com/2016/05/31/vona-gabor-nemzeti-neppart-valt-a-jobbikbol/>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Jobbik.hu* (1 June 2016), *op cit.*

[9] “Vona Gábor merészet lépett: lemondott a frakció vezetéséről.” *Index* [published online in Hungarian 29 May 2016]. http://index.hu/belfold/2016/05/29/vona_gabor_mereszet_lepett_lemondott_a_frakcio_vezeteserol/. Last accessed 11 July 2016.

[10] “Elemző: A Baloldali Pártok Együtt Sokkal Erősebbek a *Jobbik*knál.” *Magyar Idők* [published online in Hungarian 3 July 2016]. <http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/elemzo-baloldali-partok-egyutt-sokkal-erosebbek-jobbiknal-803155/>. Last accessed 9 July 2016.

[11] The references in this paragraph may be unclear to some readers.

(a) The Hungarian Guard (*Magyar Gárda*) was *Jobbik*’s paramilitary wing until the group disbanded in July 2009 pursuant to a court order. Its president was Gábor Vona, the current *Jobbik* leader. In late July 2009, a former Guard officer, Captain Róbert Kiss, and about 100 followers formed a successor organization known as the *Új Magyar Gárda* (“New Hungarian Guard”). It is closely associated with the Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem (“Hungarian Self-Defense Association for a Better Future”).

(b) In 2010, Hungary declared 4 June as *Nemzeti Összetartozás Napja* (“National Unity Day”) to commemorate the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. That agreement was one product of the Paris Peace Conference, where the victorious Allied Powers negotiated peace terms with the defeated Central Powers. It put an official end to hostilities between the Allies and the Kingdom of Hungary, and granted Hungary independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungary’s Admiral Horthy supported the Trianon Treaty, under which Hungary ceded two-thirds of its territory and some 60 percent of its population to neighboring countries.

(c) “Röske” is a southern Hungarian border town in which Hungarian counterterrorism units allegedly attacked a crowd of Arabic-speaking asylum seekers in late September 2015. See: “Újabb fotóriporter állítja, hogy ok nélkül támadt a menekültekre Röszkénél a TEK.” *Atlatszo.hu* Blogok [published online in Hungarian 23 September 2015]. <http://blog.atlatszo.hu/2015/09/ujabb-fotoriporter-allitja-hogy-ok-nelkul-tamadt-a-menekultekre-roszkenel-a-tek/>. Last accessed 9 July 2016.

(d.) The “theory of a Hungarian-Sumerian relationship” is a reference to claimed linguistic similarities between ancient Sumerian and modern Hungarian (see for example László Götz’s multi-volume study *Keleten Kél a Nap*). It is one basis for the claim that the Central Asian region of Bashkiria (part of modern Russia, directly north of Kazakhstan) is the original homeland (*Magna Hungaria*) of modern-day Hungarians. Sometimes called *Turánizmus* (“Turanism”), it is a c.19th century theory that Magyar tribes moved west from Bashkiria to conquer and settle the region known as the Carpathian Basin. It is one basis on which some on Hungary’s far right claim a genetic basis for determining whether one is (or is not, e.g., Roma and Jews) a “real” Hungarian. Among its many deficiencies, the argument conflates language and ethnicity. For an exhaustive examination of that error, see: Patrick Geary (2002). *The Myth of Nations*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). In 2009, a group of Jobbik parliamentarians called modern Kazakhstan a “kindred people” [“Ungarische Außenpolitik á la Jobbik: Ab nach Kasachstan!” *Pusztaranger* [published online in German 1 October 2009]. <https://pusztaranger.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/ungarische-ausenpolitik-a-la-jobbik-ab-nach-kasachstan/>. Last accessed 9 July 2016].

(iv) Some Jobbik leaders have alleged that the Assembly of God is “pro-Zionist” and therefore should not be considered on par with “the Catholic, Protestant or other historical Hungarian churches.” See: “A Jobbik Megfenyegette a Hit Gyülekezetét.” *Gepnarancs.hu* [published online in Hungarian 10 March 2014]. <http://gepnarancs.hu/2014/03/a-jobbik-megfenyegette-a-hit-gyulekezetet/>. Last accessed 9 July 2016.

[12] The MSZP in October 2014 formed a short-lived coalition with Fidesz and Jobbik to elect György Hiesz mayor of the northern Hungarian city of Gyöngyös.

[13] The referendum question is “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of parliament?”

[14] He made this comment in a wide-ranging interview published in early July. See: “Percemberke a kigyófészkekben – Molnár Gyula új MSZP-elnök portréja.” *Atlatszo.hu* [published online in Hungarian 6 July 2016]. <https://atlatszo.hu/2016/07/06/percemberke-a-kigyofeszkekben-molnar-gyula-uj-mszp-elnok-portreja/>. Last accessed 12 July 2016.

[15] “Diplomáciai körútra készül Vona.” *Magyar Hírlap* [published online in Hungarian 20 June 2016]. http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/58795/Diplomaciai_korutra_keszul_Vona. Last accessed 12 July 2016.

[16] “Molnár Gyula: Az Ördögtől Jobbra Állókkal Nem Fogunk Össze.” *Magyar Idők* [published online in Hungarian 4 July 2016]. <http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/molnar-gyula-az-ordogtol-jobbra-allokkal-nem-fogunk-ossze-803302/>. Last accessed 9 July 2016.

[17] “Milliárdok a Jobbiknál – kicsoda Forrai Richárd?” *Origo* [published online in Hungarian 25 May 2016]. <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20160525-jobbik-elszamolas-part.html>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[18] The acronym “kft” stands for *Korlátolt Felelősségű Társaság*, which means “limited liability corporation”.

[19] “Izraeliekkel Üzletel A Jobbik Tanácsadója.” *Magyar Idők* [published online in Hungarian 28 May 2016].

<http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/izraeliekkal-uzletel-a-jobbik-tanacsadoja-704464/>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

<http://ripost.hu/cikk-offshore-botrany-a-jobbikban-panda-az-eltitkolt-dominikai-ceg-neve>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[20] “Újabb bizonyítékok, részletek a Jobbik offshore botrányáról...”

Vonák tagadni próbálnak, fáj nekik az igazság. Hatalmas cégháló a Jobbik hátterében, ügyesen működik a mágus, Forrai Richárd.” *Ripost* [published online in Hungarian 27 May 2016]. <http://ripost.hu/cikk-ujabb-bizonyitek-keszletek-a-jobbik->

offshore-botranyarol. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[21] “Offshore-botrány a Jobbikban! Panda az eltitkolt dominikai cég neve!” *Ripost* [published online in Hungarian 27 May 2016].

[22] *Magyar Idők* (28 May 2016), *op cit.*

[23] *Ripost* (27 May 2016), *op cit.*

[24] “Nőt vitt a bozótba, a bokrok közé a Jobbik családos frakcióvezetője!” *Ripost* [published online in Hungarian 28 June 2016]. <http://ripost.hu/cikk-not-vitt-a-bozotba-a-bokrok-koze-a-jobbik-csalados-frakciovezetoje>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

“Volner János pisisztorival jönne ki a slamasztikából: Állítja, nem volt szex!” *Ripost* [published online in Hungarian 30 June 2016]. <http://ripost.hu/cikk-volner-pisisztorival-jonne-ki-a-slamasztikabol-allitja-nem-volt-szex>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

The online tabloid published grainy photographs purporting to show Mr. Volner’s car pulled off to the side of a gravel road, and Mr. Volner (partially concealed by heavy underbrush) with an unidentified woman.

In 2015, the Orbán government paid media outlets a reported USD 2.2 million to publicize its *Magyar reformok működnek* (“Hungarian reforms are working”) campaign, of which the largest online beneficiary was the online tabloid *Ripost*. See: “Fideszközeli tévék, lapok és a közmédia jártak jól a ‘működő reformokról’ szóló kampánnyal.” *444.hu* [published online in Hungarian 4 February 2016]. <http://444.hu/2016/02/04/fidesz-kozeli-tevek-lapok-es-a-kozmediumok-jartak-jol-a-mukodo-reformokrol-szolo-kampannyal>. Last accessed 7 July 2016. It is now under investigation for being “a government propaganda campaign disguised as a public service announcement” according a published reports See: “Az ügyészség vizsgálja a „Magyar reformok működnek” kampányt.” *24.hu* [published online in Hungarian 27 May 2016] <http://24.hu/belfold/2016/05/27/az-ugyeszseg-vizsgalja-a-magyar-reformok-mukodnek-kampanyt/>. Last accessed 7 July 2016. Reports published in the *Budapest Beacon* and elsewhere allege that the publisher of *Ripost*, Miklós Ómolnár, reportedly launched the outlet at the behest of Árpád Habony, an unofficial advisor to the prime minister tasked with building a pro-government, pro-Fidesz media empire.

[25] “Kínos válás elé néz a Jobbik feleségét megalázó frakcióvezetője!” *Ripost* [published online in Hungarian 7 July 2016]. <http://ripost.hu/cikk-kinos-valas-ele-nez-a-jobbik-feleseget-megalazo-frakciovezetoje>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[26] *Origo* (25 May 2016), *op cit.*

[27] “Milliárdos török üzletember a Tiborc Istvánhoz köthető cégcsoportban.” *Atlatszo* [published online in Hungarian 13 March 2016]. <https://atlatszo.hu/2016/03/13/milliardos-torok-uzletember-a-tiborc-istvanhoz-kotheto-cegcsoportban/>. Last accessed 8 July 2016.

[28] “A Tiborcához kapcsolható cégcsoport a ledózerolt József nádor téren sündörög.” *444.hu* [published online in Hungarian 17 March 2016]. <http://444.hu/2016/03/17/sundorog-a-tiborc-hoz-kapcsolhato-cegcsoport-a-ledozerolt-jozsef-nador-teren>. Last accessed 10 July 2016.

[29] “Arabok jönnek a József Nádor térre – nem Tiborc miatt pusztultak a fák.” *Válasz* [published online in Hungarian 23 March 2016]. <http://valasz.hu/itthon/arabok-jonnek-a-jozsef-nador-terre-nem-tiborc-miatt-pusztultak-a-fak-117804>. Last accessed 10 July 2016.

[30] “Ez egyre kínosabb: a nemzetbiztonsági bizottság a szaúdi olajmágnásról kérdezte Lázár Jánost.” *Magyar Narancs* [published online in Hungarian 7 June 2016]. <http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a-nemzetbiztonsagi-bizottsag-a-szaudi-olajmagnasrol-kerdezte-lazar-janost-99616>. Last accessed 10 July 2016.

[31] Mr. Janiczak was elected Ózd’s mayor in November 2014 and quickly gained notoriety for cracking down on the city’s Roma population and for installing video surveillance cameras to monitor municipal employees.

[32] “Rágalmazásért ítélték el Janiczakot, a Jobbik friss alelnökét.” *Index* [published online in Hungarian 8 June 2016]. http://index.hu/belfold/2016/06/08/ragalmazasert_italtek_el_janiczakot_a_jobbik_friss_alelnoket/. Last accessed 8 July 2016.

[33] “Elítélték a Jobbik új alelnökét.” *ATV* [published online in Hungarian 8 June 2016]. <http://www.atv.hu/belfold/20160608-elitaltek-a-jobbik-uj-alelnoket>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[34] *Index* (29 May 2016), *op cit.*

[35] Myra A. Waterbury (2010). *Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-state Nationalism in Hungary*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 122.

[36] "Sondaż: Węgrzy nie chcą wyjść z UE." *Parkiet* [published online in Polish 30 June 2016]. <http://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/160639912-Sondaz-Wegrzy-nie-chca-wyjsc-z-UE.html#ap-2>. Last accessed 7 July 2016.

[37] "Symbiotic Relationship: the Orbán Government and Lajos Simicska's Közgép." *Hungarian Spectrum* [published online 14 July 2012]. <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2012/07/14/symbiotic-relationship-the-orban-government-and-lajos-simicska-kozgep/>. Last accessed 13 July 2016.

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[41] The term is from a 2003 journal article by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond ["Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." *Party Politics*. 9:2, 167-199]. They wrote "in Western Europe today [there] are two types: left-libertarian parties and post-industrial extreme right parties." They wrote presciently that among the latter, a type that includes Jobbik, "xenophobic, racist hostility toward migrants is a highly salient line of conflict" (189) which until the recent wave of migration from the Middle East consisted of virulently anti-Roma, anti-Semitic scapegoating. In contrast, Hungary's ruling Fidesz party is what Gunther and Diamond called a "programmatic party." It "has much more of a distinct, consistent and coherent programmatic or ideological agenda than does the ideal-type catch-all party, and clearly incorporates those ideological or programmatic appeals in its electoral campaigns and its legislative and government agenda." (187)